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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
THE USE TAX
In response to needs created by the depression, many states enacted
general sales taxes. These tax laws developed both economic and
legal defects. Particularly, they could not be levied upon interstate
sales.' Avoidance of the tax was easily effected by buying out-of-state.
Not only did this result in a short-changing of the state's coffers, but
also, it produced a serious diminution of business within the state.2
Local merchants whose transactions were subject to the tax could
not compete on equal terms with out-of-state sellers. To remedy this
defect the use tax was adopted by many states.3
The use tax is a levy on the use of property which would have
been subject to a sales tax had it been purchased locally. 4 The tax
rate is usually the same as the sales levy, and the statutes generally
provide that no article on which a sales or use tax has once been paid
within the state shall be again taxable.5 Eight states provide for
compensatory or offset provisions, crediting the taxpayers with the
amount of sales or use tax paid on the purchase in any other state
up to the full amount of the levy in the taxing state.6
The constitutional validity of the general compensatory use tax,
complementary to a general sales tax, was established in Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co.7 The principle of compensating taxation in interstate
commerce had previously gained approval.8 Also taxes upon the use
of gasoline within the state, though neither general nor complementary
to a sales tax, had been sustained, 9 as had taxes upon storage and
Lowndes, State Taxation of Interstate Sales (1935) 7 Miss. L.J. 223,
229.
2It seems likely to suppose that avoidance practices are indulged in
by large scale purchasers rather than the average consumer. See
Lowndes, supra note 1 at 223.
3 Rule 178 of the Tax Commission of Washington states: "The primary
purpose of the compensating tax is to protect the merchants of
Washington from discrimination arising by reason of the inability
of the state, because of the Federal Constitution, to impose a tax
upon sales made to residents of this state by competitive mer-
chants in other states." C.C.H. Wash. 58-950 (1937). For a
list of states with use taxes see MARKETING LAWS SURVEY W.P.A.
(1939) 73-81.
4 See the statement by Mr. Justice Cardozo: "The privilege of use is
only one attribute, among many, of the bundle of privileges that
make property or ownership . . . . A state is at liberty, if it
pleases, to tax them all collectively, or to separate the faggots
and lay the charges distributively. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,
300 U.S. 577, 582 (1937). Yet it seems unquestioned that the
use tax does not partake of the nature of a property tax to such
an extent as to require uniformity or meet the other constitutional
limitations on property taxes.
5 A typical use tax statute is Calif. Acts. 1935, ch. 361.
6 MARKETING LAWS SURVEY W.P.A. (1939) 73.
7300 U.S. 577 (1937).
8 Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148 (U.S.1868).
9 Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932); Monamotor Oil Co.
v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934).
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withdrawal from storage,o even though the articles were to be used
in interstate commerce. The rationale upon which the storag and
withdrawal taxes were sustained was that the "use" was wholly intra-
state, and therefore taxable by the state, even though the article was
intended for immediate consumption in interstate commerce.1 The
same rationale was used in sustaining the general compensatory use
tax.12
As the use tax is sustained upon the theory that interstate move-
ment has either ceased or not begun, the ever-present question as to
when interstate commerce begins and ends complicates the question of
validity and practical value of the use tax. A use tax has been upheld
though applied to extrastate purchases of a foreign corporation en-
gaged in interstate commerce, to be used in interstate commerce, and
installed immediately upon arrival within the state.1 3 The court said:
"We think there was a taxable moment when the former had reached
the end of their interstate transportation and had not yet begun to
be consumed in interstate operation . . . . Practical continuity does
not always make an act a part of interstate commerce .... "1J4
The use tax upheld in the Silas Mason Co. case permitted a credit
for a sales or use tax of whatever amount or wherever paid.15 While
the courts recognize and distinguish the two types of use tax,10 the
non-compensatory tax has also been upheld.' 7 In so holding the court
rejected the contention that the possibility of multiple taxation ren-
dered the tax unconstitutional.' 3  This seems inconsistent with the
language of other tax cases, where the mere possibility of multiple
1ONashville, etc., Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); Edelman v.
Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289 U.S. 249 (1933).
"1 Nashville, etc., Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 268 (1933).
12 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582 (1937).
-Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939); Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939);
Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 113 F (2d) 853
(C.C.A. 10th, 1940).
14 Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 177 (1939).
"Wash. Act 1935. ch. 180, §32 (C), 33. This compensatory provision
has been eliminated by amendment. Wash. Acts. 1935, ch. 191, §2.
30 This is apparent in the Silas Mason Co. case not only from the em-
phasis placed upon equality and non-discrimination, but from the
following words of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "We have not meant to
imply by anything said in this opinion that allowance of a credit
for other taxes paid to Washington made it mandatory that there
should be a like allowance for taxes paid to other states. A state,
for many purposes, is to be reckoned a self-contained unit, which
may frame its own systems of burdens and exemptions without
heeding systems elsewhere. If there are limits to that power,
there is no need to mark them now. It will be time enough to
mark them when a taxpayer paying in the state of origin is com-
pelled to pay again in the state of destination." 300 U.S. 577, 587.
17 Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939).
Is Id. at 172. The court repeated the "time enough" formula set forth
in the Silas Mason Co. case. See note 16 supra.
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taxation on interstate commerce was held to invalidate the tax.19
The question as to the validity of such a tax in a case where multiple
taxation was actually proved was expressly reserved.20
In addition to the legal aspects of the use tax, consideration must
be given to economic problems created by this method of taxation.
Only the non-compensatory use tax is regarded as a barrier to inter-
state trade,21 yet it would seem that even a use tax with compensatory
provisions might so operate as to restrict trade between the states.
The restriction from such a statute might arise in any one of three
ways, or possible combinations thereof. Administrative discrimination
in enforcement of the tax act is one ever-present potential barrier.
Such a restriction is of course extra-legal. A second possibility where-
by the compensatory use tax may operate as a barrier is suggested
by the question of incidence of taxation.22 The sales tax is paid by
the seller; the use tax is frequently if not usually collected from the
consumer.23 Unless, then, the sales tax is shifted in its entirety,24
there will be no equivalent burden on the two classes of consumers
and there will be a consequent discrimination against out-of-state mer-
chants. There is a plethora of economic authority contradicting the
inevitability of such a shift in its entirety,25 and if true it would
seem that in some cases where the use tax is collected from the pur-
chaser an unseen barrier exists. The court has, however, held that
this was not a constitutional objection, as "this is not a discrimina-
tion in the law."28
The third barrier which may arise from even a compensatory use
tax is found in provision for collection of the tax by the out-of-state
seller maintaining an office within the state or doing business in the
state.27 Here again the question of incidence of taxation is presented.
If there is not an equivalent shift to both user and buyer, there is a
discrimination which would tend to interfere with interstate trade.
But assuming this question disposed of, a more important question
i9 "Unlawfulness of burden depends upon its nature, measured in terms
of its capacity to obstruct interstate commerce, and not on the
contingency that some other state may first have subjected the
commerce to like burden . . . ." Gwin, White and Prince v.
Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1939); Adams Manufacturing
Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
20 See note 18 supra.
21 Melder, Trade Barriers and States Rights (1939) 25 A.B.A.J. 307;
Moore, Address-Interstate Trade Barriers . . . A Challenge to
Our Economy (1939), N.A.M., New York.
22 Warren and Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes (1938) 38 Col. L.
Rev. 49.
23 Id. at 70.
2 "A tax is, as it were, a sticky substance, and like pitch or shoe-
maker's wax, some of it may adhere to every hand or thread that
touches it." PLEHN, INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC FINANCE (1926) 24-25.25 Warren and Schlesinger, supra note 23 at 71. (Footnote 104).
26 Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 172. (1939).
27 For a discussion of jurisdiction to compel collection, see note (1939)
27 Calif. L. Rev. 360.
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remains. Is the burden of collection imposed upon the out-of-state
dealer a barrier? The United States Supreme Court has taken the
position that it is not, on the theory that the state makes the distrib-
utor its agent for that purpose.28
But the contention is made that despite the decisions of the court,
compelling collection by out-of-state dealers burdens interstate com-
merce in two ways. First, the additional economic burden of account-
ing and reporting expense. Second, the subjection of the out-of-state
dealers' books to the examination of the officials of the collecting
state. It is not claimed that this subjection discriminates between
the in-state dealers and the out-of-state dealers, as both are equally
subject to the state's auditors. The contention is that it discriminates
between two out-of-state competitors, one of whom has an agent or
office within the taxing state so as to be "doing business within the
state," while the other sells within the taxing state by mail orders
or non-resident salesmen, and is not "doing business" therein. The
former is subject to examination of books while the latter is not. As
a result of this discrimination, the tendency is for the dealer subject
to examination to withdraw from the taxing state to an extent suf-
ficient to avoid tax jurisdiction.
It is to be doubted whether the first contention is of a serious
nature, as the additional expense cannot be substantial. And the
answer to the second objection, so far as the use tax is concerned, is
that it is not the collection of a tax which gives jurisdiction to ex-
amine books, but the doing business within the state. If the taxing
state may compel collection of a use tax, it also has the power to
examine books for purposes of determining sales tax evasions even
in the absence of a use tax.
Regardless of the merits of these contentions, by the analysis of
barriers elsewhere discussed,29 neither the additional accounting ex-
pense nor the subjection to examination of books is, on the face of the
law, a barrier. Neither is a discrimination as between states. Hence
it seems that even if a burden on interstate commerce actually exists,
it is not properly termed a barrier.
In view of its widespread operation, the gasoline use tax requires
special attention. Every state levies this tax.3o The validity of these
taxes involves a resolution of two conflicting principles. A state may
tax interstate commerce to compensate for the use of its highways
by interstate carriers.31  "Interstate commerce must pay its own
2S Ionamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934) ; Felt and Tarrant
Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939). But cf. Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Roddewig, 292 N.W. 130 (Iowa 1940).
Z' See, Melder, supra, p. 127.
3o Commonwealth v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 255 Ky. 111, 72 S.W. (2d)
1032, 1035 (1934), The Indiana tax, IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns
1933) §47-1501 et seq., was upheld in Gafill v. Bracken, 195 Ind.
551, 145 N.E. 312 (1924).
31 Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 (1936); Aero Mayflower Transit
Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 295 U.S. 285 (1935); Hick-
lin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933); Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554
(1927).
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way."3' 2 Opposed to this is the hoary immunity doctrine-that a tax
on the use of an instrumentality in interstate commerce is an uncon-
stitutional burden.33
In an early case an excise tax on the consumption of gasoline by
an instrumentality engaged solely in interstate commerce was held un-
constitutional as a direct burden.84 Although this case is still cited
as authority,3S later decisions have made substantial inroads upon
the immunity provided by this decision.36 The present position of the
court seems to be that a use tax may be imposed on motor fuel if it
is exacted as compensation for the use of highways or other facilities
provided by the state.87 On this rationale a use tax on gasoline con-
sumed by airplanes engaged in interstate commerce has been upheld.8
But if the statute imposes an excise tax for the use of an instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce it contravenes the commerce clause.3 0
Insofar as the gasoline use tax is imposed solely upon fuel ac-
tually consumed within a state, it seems unquestionable that the tax
is not a trade barrier, regardless of its constitutionality. No discrim-
ination against out-of-state carriers exists on the face of the law, as
it operates equally upon local commerce. But the practical problem,
of enforcement presents difficulty. How much gasoline is actually
consumed within the state? If the only criterion is fuel purchased
within the state, the simple expedient of loading up before entering
the state not only avoids the tax, but favors out-of-state gas dealers
over local dealers. One attempted remedy came before the court in
MeCarroll v Dixie Greyhound Lines.40 An Arkansas statute4 ' required
the payment of the state tax upon all gasoline in excess of twenty
gallons carried into the state in motor vehicle fuel tanks. The court
3
'Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. V.
Tax Board, 280 U.S. 338, 351 (1930).
3 Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929). But see Mr. Justice Stone
concurring, p. 253.
34 Ibid.
35 Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Lines, 297 U.S. 626 (1936); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939).
86 Warren and Schlesinger, supra note 23. A sales tax on gasoline
used only in interstate commerce is valid. Air Transport, Inc.
v. Tax Commission, 285 U.S. 147 (1932). Although a sales tax
may be distinguishable from a use tax on a temporal or geograph-
ical basis, from an economic viewpoint the burden on interstate
commerce seems the same. That the court is not concerned with
economic burdens is suggested by the language of Mr. Justice Reed
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S., at 177-78 (1939).
"It is true, the increased cost to the interstate operator from a
tax on installation is the same as from a tax on consumption or
operation. This is not significant. The prohibited burden ....
is created by state interference with that commerce, a matter
distinct from the expense of doing business."
87 Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Lines, 297 U.S. 626 (1936); McCarroll
v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176 (1940).
8sVarney Air Lines v. Babcock, 1 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Idaho, 1932).
89 Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Lines, 297 U.S. 626 (1936).
40309 U.S. 176 (1940).
4 Arkansas Acts 1933, Act 67. Indiana has a similar statute with a
15 gallon limit. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933). §47-1504.
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held that the imposition of the tax in this particular case was an uncon-
stitutional burden on interstate commerce. Both the majority and the
minority agreed that the use of gasoline within the state might be
taxed as compensation for the use of its highways. Likewise both
agreed to a limitation of this principle. "It must appear on the face
of the statute or be demonstrable that the tax as laid is measured
by or has some fair relationship to the use of the highways for which
the charge is made."42 But the court split on the application of this
rule to the facts of the case, the majority holding that no such re-
lationship existed.43
Of perhaps greater significance than the decision in this case is
the theory expressed by the three dissenting justices,44 that it is better
to leave the whole matter of interstate trade barriers to Congress
rather than to depend upon the "spasmodic and unrelated instances
of litigation" in the courts. 45
As was pointed out above, the use tax was conceived to remedy
the defects in sales tax laws. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co. sus-
tained a statute which imposed a tax by the buyer's state on the trans-
fer of possession of goods purchased for consumption even though
the delivery was a necessary part of interstate commerce.46 As the
court failed to make a point as to whether interstate commerce had
ended, it would seem that the decision extended the state's taxing
power over interstate commerce. It has been stated that this case,
with a companion case,47 "appears to completely overrule the doctrine
of tax immunity of interstate sales.143 Since the decision in the
Berwind-White case it is at least questionable whether the use tax
is still needed to complement the sales tax.49 It seems doubtful, how-
ever, in view of the favor with which the courts have regarded the
use tax, that legislatures will repeal existing use tax laws and risk deci-
sions under sales tax laws.
F. L., Jr.
42 309 U.S. 176 (1940).
43 Ibid. "It is not enough that the tax when collected is expended upon
the state's highways."
4 Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and Mr. Justice Douglas.
45 309 U.S. at 188-89.
46309 U.S. 33 (1940).
47 McGoldrick v. A. H. Dugrenier, 309 U.S. 70 (1940).
48 Note (1940) 15 Ind. L. J. 316, 319.
49 The Committee on Uniform Sales Taxation of the National Associa-
tion of Tax Administration has proposed that a sale for consump-
tion within the state is taxable when (1) the seller is engaged in
the business of selling such goods in the state and (2) delivery
is made in the state. Delivery is made within the state (1) when
physical possession is transferred therein or (2) when placed in
the mails or on board a carrier outside the state and directed to
a buyer in the state. Engaging in business includes not only the
usual legal meaning of the term, but also merely having a sales-
man subject to authority within the state, whether permanently
or temporarily. It is immaterial that the contract of sale is closed
outside the state. Goods sold within the state for shipment out
by the seller are exempt from the tax, provided they are not
returned to a point within the state. This regulation has been
adopted by Missouri, effective on and after the 1st day of Oc-
tober, 1940.
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